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1. Introduction. 
The economic and political transformations of Spain in the Early Modern period, first rising to 
the helm of a global empire and then dramatically losing population and productive strength,  are 
among the quintessential topics in European economic history.
1 While the literature has 
gradually moved to emphasize the role played by institutions, it has mostly stopped short of a 
detailed primary-source based analysis of the institutional structures that are normally identified 
as the main brake on Spanish economic growth, such as the monarchy, the nobility, the trade, 
craft and shepherd guilds, and the Catholic Church. The improved access and cataloguing of the 
vast archival resources on Early Modern Spain offer now a unique opportunity to apply what 
Greif (2006) terms “the empirical method of institutional analysis” to this timeless problem. 
As part of a wider research agenda on the institutional foundations of Early Modern Spain, this 
paper takes a close look at the Castilian lower nobility, the hidalgos of Don Quixote fame, on 
whom scholars of the calibre of Carlo Cipolla, Fernand Braudel, J. H. Elliott, and David Landes 
among others have squarely placed the blame of spreading a mentality of idleness and a disdain 
for manual labour.
2 The number of petty nobles, who were exempt from direct taxes and enjoyed 
several legal and social privileges, is widely believed to have rapidly grown during the sixteenth 
century in response to the increasing fiscal pressure of the Habsburg monarchs and the appeal of 
living a “noble life.” Since hidalgos were legally impeded from engaging in trade and industry, 
and since all their legitimate male sons inherited the title in perpetuity, the foregone conclusion is 
                                                 
1 Major works on Early Modern Spain have continued to appear at a sustained rate in the last decade. For just three 
very recent influential examples, see Marcos Martín (2000), Kamen (2003) and Yun (2004). For an institutionalist 
treatment of the Spanish case within a wider European context, see North and Thomas (1973) and Acemoglu et al. 
(2005). 
2 The references to hidalgos and the “hidalgo mentality” can be found in Elliott (1963), p.115-117; Braudel (1972), 
p. 520-523; Cipolla (1980), p. 237-241; and Landes (1999), p. 172-173. MacKay (2006) provides a strongly 
revisionist view, which is consistent with the findings in this article. 3 
that such a social migration resulted in a large misallocation of talent. Braudel saw in the flight to 
nobility a failure to nurture capitalism to full maturity, and scornfully christened it “the treason 
of the bourgeoisie.”
3 This traditional interpretation suggests obvious links with the literature on 
the allocation of talent in the style of Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991), which argues that 
the inefficient allocation of human capital in rent seeking environments may have a stifling effect 
on economic growth. The archival record, however, is largely silent about whether hidalgos 
complied with the legal restrictions on their economic activity; what little evidence there is 
suggests that violations were generalized, while no attempts to enforce compliance are present in 
the data. 
Contrary to the widespread belief that large numbers of hidalguías were sold by the Crown, the 
almost exclusive gateway into the lower nobility in the sixteenth century was litigation in one of 
the two Royal Chancery Courts of the kingdom. The holdings of the Archivo de la Real 
Chancillería de Valladolid, well known to genealogists but barely exploited by social scientists, 
are a treasure trove for the study of hidalguía. In a first attempt to characterize the temporal 
evolution of the institution, I have compiled a time series of the surviving 42,313 cases filed with 
the Valladolid Chancery Court, which had jurisdiction over the northern half of Castile. The 
series, which extends between 1490 and 1834, shows a large increase in legal activity in the mid-
sixteenth century, thus confirming the impression that the pace of ennoblement was fastest 
during that period. 
While the argument for the treason of the bourgeoisie seems unpersuasive, a careful examination 
of the archival record points to a different and more compelling rent-seeking scenario. It starts by 
challenging the conventional wisdom that places tax exemptions at the centre for of the quest for 
                                                 
3 Braudel (1972), p. 517. 4 
nobility while ignoring or summarily treating the remaining entitlements of hidalgos. By 
matching lawsuit costs to tax data, I show that the fiscal benefits of ennoblement could not alone 
have justified its cost. The evidence points instead to the acquisition of municipal offices and the 
control over common resources that came with them as the main reason – the “central 
transaction” in Greif’s terms – behind the quest for nobility.
4 Such a finding frames the hidalgo 
problem as an eminently local issue and places it firmly into the rent seeking literature, which 
has made surprisingly little foray into the study of Spanish institutions.
5 
I then trace a distinction between nobility lawsuits, which commoners used to attain noble status, 
and distributive lawsuits, which existing hidalgos used to wrestle control of municipal offices 
from incumbent commoners, and consider the efficiency costs of redistributive and ennoblement 
activities revealed by archival documents. I find that in the towns with high levels of litigation 
the transfers to central courts, lawyers and royal officials were large enough to cripple local 
economies and forestall their possibilities of growth.
6 In most towns, however, redistribution 
took place without costly litigation, eliminating net losses to the local economy and resulting in 
mere transfers from commoners to nobles.
7 The non-compliance of hidalgos with the 
requirement of abstaining from manual work also reduces the likelihood that ennoblement 
resulted in a misallocation of human capital. Hidalgos may have been resented by the 
commoners they displaced from town governments and loathed by eighteenth and nineteenth 
                                                 
4 Greif (2006), p. 47. 
5 See Ekelund and Tollison (1997) for an example mostly focused on the Mesta. 
6 A substantial literatutre exists on the relationship between rent seeking and economic growth; see Murphy et al. 
(1993), DeLong and Shleifer (1993), Tornell and Lane (1999).  
7 For a model where rent seeking can occur while open conflict remains off the equilibrium path see González 
(2005). 5 
century liberal reformers; they are, however, unlikely to have exerted any significant influence 
on Spanish economic performance. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 characterizes the institution of hidalguía and 
introduces a new time series of ennoblement lawsuits. Section 3 discusses distributive litigation. 
Section 4 combines the historical evidence and primary source data on both types of litigation to 
support the central arguments of the paper. Section 5 summarizes my findings and explores their 
implications.  
2. The nature and evolution of hidalguía. 
Hidalgos: the Sons of Something. 
The very word hidalgo embodies the nature of those who wore the title with pride; while even its 
origin has been unable to escape dispute, the most commonly accepted etymology is hijo de 
algo, literally “son of something” (where “something” means “someone of value”). The oldest 
hidalgo families claimed to be able to trace their origins to the Visigothic lineages of the days 
before the Muslim invasion of the peninsula in 711 A.D., and to have gained their status through 
distinguished military service to the monarchs of the northern kingdoms in the course of the 
Reconquista. During the Middle Ages, hidalgos were in fact expected to maintain weapons and a 
horse, and to join the king’s army whenever called to war; in return, they were granted special 
privileges, foremost among which the exemption from royal and municipal taxes.
8 
                                                 
8 Hidalguía, in its most open meaning, is synonym with nobility; all Spanish nobles, including grandees and títulos 
(dukes, marquises, counts and viscounts), were technically hidalgos. I am not concerned with those upper echelons, 
and will therefore use the word in its narrow sense, designating the lower nobility that, while always striving to 
climb the ranks of society, was just one step above the plain commoner. For a thorough discussion of the structure of 
the Spanish nobility see Domínguez Ortiz (1985). For an excellent historical survey on the several social strata that 
gradually converged into Early Modern hidalgos, see Díaz de la Guardia (2005), chapters 1-4. 6 
While tax exemptions were the most transparent and visible attribute of hidalgo status, they were 
not always the most valuable one.
9 Direct taxes were no longer a significant burden in the first 
half of the sixteenth century, and in many towns they were even assessed on a capitation basis, 
making them virtually negligible for the rich. Hidalgos, however, also enjoyed preferential 
access to municipal offices under the system called mitad de los oficios, which reserved half of 
the top positions in the local government for them.
10 Their privileges under criminal law were 
paramount: they could not be tortured, flogged or exposed to public shame; if jailed, they had to 
be kept separate from the commoners; they could not be sent to the galleys, and, if sentenced to 
death, they had the right to be beheaded rather than hanged. Perhaps their most valuable 
immunity on a practical basis was the exemption from prison by reason of debt. That hidalgos 
were entitled by law to enjoy all these privileges, however, does not mean that local authorities 
always bowed to them – a point which I shall return to below. 
A much debated attribute of hidalguía is its theoretical incompatibility with the so-called 
“mechanical” and “vile” professions, virtually any occupation that involved manual work, 
together with tax collection (but not tax farming) and a few other outcast activities.
11 The 
increase in the number of hidalgos in the sixteenth century has been repeatedly singled out as 
one of the reasons behind the “crisis of the seventeenth century,” as more and more successful 
merchants and traders supposedly abandoned their activities to live off the rents of the land or of 
                                                 
9 So indissoluble were hidalgo status and the exemption from royal and municipal pechos that someone who did not 
pay them and remained unchallenged would in time be recognized as an hidalgo, while paying them at any point 
without protest would jeopardize any chances of affirming an hidalguía. Such identity is again etched into the 
language: the Spanish word for a commoner is pechero, someone who pays direct taxes. See Thompson (1987) for a 
discussion on the language of class distinction in Spain. 
10 While the system of mitad de los oficios has normally received very little attention in the scholarly literature, the 
recent doctoral dissertation by Díaz de la Guardia (2005) is now a mandatory reference for its study. 
11 Some insightful works on “mechanical and vile” occupations are Domínguez Ortiz (1945), Díez (1990) and 
MacKay (2006).  7 
tax farms. Clearly such a prohibition was not universally enforced, as it would have been a 
practical impossibility for everyone to abstain from manual work in areas that enjoyed universal 
hidalguía.
12 Sixteenth and seventeenth-century craftsmen and traders (so Ruth MacKay has 
recently shown) did not distinguish occupations between “vile” and “noble” ones; the linguistic 
expressions was in fact introduced by the eighteenth century liberal reformers in order to further 
their political agenda.
13 Perhaps the clearest evidence that hidalgos did not worry too much about 
steering clear of manual tasks is found in the lawsuits themselves. While one would not expect a 
claimant of nobility to disclose in front of a court that he held a supposedly incompatible 
occupation, that is exactly what happened from time to time.
14 At least in the sixteenth century 
no one seemed very concerned that hidalgos got their hands dirty with manual labor.  
It has long been contended that the number of hidalgos swelled in the sixteenth century, but the 
dynamics, magnitude and significance of this phenomenon have not been the subject of a 
thorough scholarly discussion so far. A very common misconception is that the increase in the 
hidalgo ranks was the result of massive sales of letters of privilege on the part of the Crown 
during the reigns of Charles V and Philip II; the myth has continued to surface every now and 
then, even in the face of Thompson’s categorical refutation.
15 Sales of hidalguías were indeed an 
extremely rare occurrence as a result of the nature of the privilege itself. The archetypical 
                                                 
12 The natives of Biscay, for example, were all considered hidalgos. See Marcos Martín (2000), p. 301. 
13 MacKay (2006). 
14 In the lawsuit of Benito de Caldas (SHP 68.3) the original complaint stated that the claimant was an ironsmith. 
Apparently someone noticed the blunder, as the word “herrador” was hastily crossed out; it was not, however, a 
sufficient source of concern for the scribe to rewrite the entire page. In a different case, a copy of an ejecutoria from 
1547 states that Hernán García, from Tordesillas, was a carpenter (SHP 1646.1). In both cases the claimants were 
successful in gaining noble status. Finally, in a distributive lawsuit from Peñafiel in 1582, the town contended that 
hidalgos should have been forbidden from discharging two public offices at the same time; the case arose because 
one hidalgo had been elected mayor while at the same time working in the butcher shop, a city-operated 
establishment (PAF 538.5). 
15 Thompson (1979). For two notable examples where the incorrect view receives attention see Elliott (1963), p. 116 
and Nadal (2001), p. 40. 8 
hidalgo was someone who could trace his lineage to the medieval noble families of old, whose 
first noble ancestor was lost in time immemorial, and whom people would recognize as a noble 
person without the need of an intervening authority. Paying for the privilege was the ultimate 
admission that one did not deserve it. While patents of hidalguía remained available for sale, the 
Crown understood that they would only be bought by the most desperate persons, and set 
accordingly exorbitant prices for them. Thompson’s exhaustive analysis of the sales of 
hidalguías uncovered an utterly insignificant grand total of 72 royal letters of privilege for the 
whole kingdom of Castile in the sixteenth century.
16 
The lawsuits over hidalguía. 
When an hidalguía was challenged, usually by a town council that tried to collect direct taxes 
from its holder, the individual claiming to be an hidalgo could only affirm his status by suing the 
town in one of the two Royal Chancery Courts of Castile, which resided at Valladolid and 
Granada. The Chancery Courts (chancillerías) were the highest tribunals in the kingdom short of 
the Royal Council, and, from the fifteenth century onwards, had exclusive jurisdiction in all 
cases concerning the dispute of an hidalguía, which were heard by a special chamber called the 
Sala de Hijosdalgo.
17 To distinguish them from the “distributive lawsuits” described  in the next 
section, I shall refer to lawsuits over hidalguía as “nobility” or “ennoblement” lawsuits. 
To win a lawsuit, a claimant of hidalguía would have to prove, at a minimum, that his father and 
grandfather had been hidalgos, widely reputed as such in the places where they had lived. He had 
therefore to produce witnesses that had known (or claimed to have known) his father and 
                                                 
16 Thompson (1979), p. 357. 
17 The mandatory source for the structure and operation of the Sala de Hijosdalgo is Martín Postigo and Domínguez 
Rodríguez (1990), on which virtually all my references on the functioning of the chamber are based. A thorough 
historical and juridical treatment of the lawsuit of hidalguía can be found in Díaz de la Guardia (2005), chapter 3.2. 9 
grandfather, and could confirm their status. The town council, together with the king’s 
prosecutor (who intervened ex-officio in all lawsuits of hidalguía), would try to show that the 
claimant or his ancestors were not hidalgos, presenting evidence that they had paid direct taxes 
or had not enjoyed certain criminal or legal privileges. Alternatively, they could try to find one or 
more impediments to their hidalguía, such as being illegitimate sons or having Jewish ancestry.
18 
If the claimant won the case, upon receiving a favourable final sentence (which might not come 
until after one or two appeals) he could ask the court to issue a final writ, called a carta 
ejecutoria, which summarized the lawsuit and ordered all authorities in the kingdom to recognize 
its holder as an hidalgo. 
Lawsuits were not cheap; a claimant had to retain attorneys in Valladolid or Granada, pay a 
number of court and secretarial fees, pay for the travel, room and board of witnesses called to 
testify on his behalf from remote locations and, if successful, pay the fee for the issuance of the 
carta ejecutoria. In addition, more or less overt bribes and gifts to several court officials were 
essential to ensure that the proceedings would move forward at a reasonable pace. 
Two cheaper legal devices, albeit of lower standing than a lawsuit, were available to claimants of 
hidalguía. An hidalgo who anticipated a legal challenge or feared that his supporting witnesses 
could die or relocate could register the depositions of those witnesses with the court in a 
document called probanza ad perpetuam rei memoriam (which, for lack of a better term, I shall 
                                                 
18 As a result, the prosecution often presented very colorful stories. The lawsuit of St. Theresa’s father contains a 
copy of the Inquisition proceedings that documented how his grandfather had converted from Judaism and had been 
forced to wear the shameful robe of the conversos for two months (Ejido 1986). In the lawsuit of Benito de Caldas 
in 1544 witnesses for the prosecution testified that his grandfather had been held in a common jail and sentenced to 
lashes for petty theft (SHP 68.3). In the lawsuit of Alonso de Melgar in 1556, in a standard contention, the 
prosecutor alleged that he was the son of “plain commoners, converted Jews, adulterous and incestuous” (SHP 
871.8). Similarly, in the lawsuit of the brothers Gaspar and Francisco de Villodas in 1554, the town produced 
witnesses who testified that their grandfather had been a clergyman, and hence their father was an illegitimate child 
(SHP 351.3). Melgar lost his case, but all the others were able to have their hidalguías confirmed despite the 
obvious impediments.  10 
hereafter call “deposition”). The town and the king’s prosecutor normally did not intervene in the 
process and the document was not enforceable by itself; it could, however, be used as evidence 
in lawsuits, and therefore its existence could conceivably deter future legal challenges. Another 
possibility was to request a royal provision from the court, which certified the “known status” of 
its holder. The town and the king’s prosecutor normally opposed the claim of hidalguía in the 
legal proceedings (called expedientes provisionales, translated here as “provisional files”), 
which, although reminiscent of lawsuits, were simpler, faster and cheaper. They did not result in 
a carta ejecutoria, though, which remained the only enforceable document. Royal provisions 
became mandatory in the eighteenth century for hidalgos moving to another jurisdiction to 
become registered as such, causing a large increase in their numbers.
19 
The Archive of the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid is an invaluable source of information 
on the judicial route to nobility.
20 With the exception of short interruptions forced by the plague 
or the presence of the king’s entourage in town, the court resided in the same Valladolid palace 
throughout its entire existence. Its archive opened in the early years of the seventeenth century as 
a venal office, and gradually acquired the records from the court secretaries, who had until then 
treated the files as their personal property. Since the holder of the records could charge for access 
to them, there was a continuous interest in preserving their integrity; while some files must have 
certainly gone missing, the holdings of the archive can be reasonably trusted to provide broad 
and representative coverage of the universe of cases heard by the court. In a 100% hand check of 
one of the eight inventory books describing the transfer of lawsuit files from the secretaries to the 
archive since the seventeenth century, I found that over 93% of the files originally entrusted to 
                                                 
19 Díaz de la Guardia (2005), p. 449. 
20 The main reference on the history of the Archive of the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid, on which this 
account relies, is Martín Postigo (1979). 11 
the archive have survived to the present and that the missing ones are evenly spread out over the 
life of the court, indicating no systematic loss of information.
21 In contrast, the Archive of the 
Royal Chancery Court of Granada did not open until forty years after the court closed in 1834; as 
a result, a large number of cases were lost, and the surviving holdings number less than a quarter 
than their Valladolid counterparts. This study is limited to cases from the Valladolid court, and 
hence to its geographical jurisdiction north of the river Tagus (roughly the northern half of 
Spain).  
Figure 1 shows the temporal distribution of the 42,313 cases preserved in the section Sala de 
Hijosdalgo of the Archive of the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid. Lawsuits proper are 
classified according to whether a carta ejecutoria was issued in the case or not; if a carta 
ejecutoria exists (and hence the hidalguía was confirmed), the lawsuit is said to be “defunct” 
(fenecido).
22 Otherwise, the lawsuit is called “forgotten” (olvidado). Depositions, provisional 
files and unclassified papers are also shown. 
                                                 
21 The checked inventory book was Sala de Hijosdalgo, Libro 81. This is the only book that is cross-referenced to 
the current catalogue in a systematic way, and hence allowed for the check to be conducted. It contains all the 
defunct lawsuits from one of the two secretary offices serving the Sala de Hijosdalgo; since cases were randomly 
assigned to the secretary offices upon being filed, this inventory book constitutes a 50% random sample of all 
defunct lawsuits. The assistance of Clara Ortego, who worked on the original mapping of the inventory books to the 
electronic catalogue, was instrumental in designing this check. 
22 If the hidalguía was denied, the town could always tax the claimant or seize his goods without the need of a royal 
writ; it is hence safe to assume that all fenecido lawsuits did confirm an hidalguía. In an extremely rare exception, 
the town of Medina de Pomar requested a carta ejecutoria on the lawsuit it had won against Juan del Campo, its 
second wealthiest taxpayer, in 1555. The town might have sought additional assurances in view of the wealth, and 
perhaps power, of its opponent. See SHP 424.4, RE 845.2, PP 68.6. 12 
     Figure 1: Cases by type, 1490-1834 
      
Compiled from the catalogue of the Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid and an 
unpublished classification table by Eduardo Pedruelo Martín.  
 
Figure 1 reveals that the activity in the Sala de Hijosdalgo had two peaks, in the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries, with a prolonged slump in the seventeenth. Lawsuits proper, however, are 
concentrated only in the sixteenth century, peaking in the decade of 1550, which had a yearly 
average of almost 200 cases filed, with over half of them resulting in a confirmation of the 
hidalguía.
23  
The number of defunct lawsuits is not an exact reflection of the increase in the number of 
hidalgo families. A substantial number of forgotten lawsuits also confirm the hidalguía; it is 
possible that the claimant, having settled his position within the town, did not request a carta 
ejecutoria to avoid further expenses. On the other hand, some lawsuits were filed by legitimate 
                                                 
23 The second peak is a result of the administrative requirement, enacted in 1703, of obtaining a royal provision 
before an hidalgo could be registered as such in his new place of residence, and hence it does not reflect new 
ennoblement. See Díaz de la Guardia (2005), pp. 449-450. 13 
claimants whose rights were being infringed; favourable sentences in such cases did not increase 
the number of hidalgos (although unfavourable ones might have reduced it). Finally, it is 
important to keep in mind that legal proceedings only capture situations of conflict; if someone 
declared himself an hidalgo and no one challenged him, after a few years he would most likely 
be reputed as such without the need of a lawsuit. As a speaker in the Cortes of 1624 put it: 
The officials of the towns and villages will not dare list anyone in the tax tolls who 
is prepared to go to litigation, however well known a commoner he is. Thus he is 
left exempted as if he were an hidalgo, and so becomes one. Contrariwise, if they 
list an hidalgo who is poor, he cannot litigate and loses his hidalguía.
24 
The shape of the distribution is nonetheless consistent with contemporary and historiographical 
accounts of the swelling of the ranks of hidalgos in the sixteenth century. 
A glimpse on the composition of Northern Castilian society. 
The only relatively firm observation on the number of hidalgos in sixteenth-century Spain is the 
census of households taken in 1590, which revealed that 108,358 out of 897,130 households in 
the Crown of Castile, about 12% of the total, enjoyed noble status.
25 The global figure, however, 
yields little information about the regional variation in the distribution of hidalgos, as well as no 
insight into the finer distinctions within the noble and commoner ranks. 
A rare 1530 tax roll from the town of Briones, in modern-day La Rioja, can provide some 
additional insight into the matter. This document lists the individual assessments of a direct royal 
tax (moneda forera), which the village paid to the Crown every six years. Unlike most rolls that 
only list commoners (called “pecheros” after the name of the taxes they paid, the pechos), this 
                                                 
24 Quoted in Thompson (1987), p. 26. 
25 González (1820). A household corresponded to roughly 5 inhabitants, which puts the population of Castile in 1590 
at about four and half million. Excluded from this are the roughly 100,000 households of the Crown of Aragon, 
which had a different nobility structure. See Artola (1993), vol. 6, p. 589. 14 
particular one lists hidalgos as well, further breaking down their status into “notable” hidalgos 
(i.e. those whose status no one would dare question), those who had obtained the title by royal 
privilege, and those who were in possession of a carta ejecutoria, all of them duly entered with a 
zero tax liability. It also identifies “dubious” hidalgos, who were assessed taxes as plain 
taxpayers, but by being listed as such preserved the right to litigate in the future. Table 1 reports 
the breakdown of this tax roll by the status of the head of household.
26 
Table 1: Heads of households by status (Briones, 1530) 
Status of the head of household  Number  % of Total 
Hidalgo households     
Notable hidalgo  125  25.46% 
Hidalgo by privilege  3  0.61% 
Hidalgo by ejecutoria  1  0.20% 
Widow of an hidalgo  32  6.52% 
Orphaned son of an hidalgo  7  1.43% 
Orphaned daughter of an hidalgo  1  0.20% 
Total hidalgo households  169  34.42% 
Taxpayer households     
Dubious hidalgo  67  13.65% 
Widow of a dubious hidalgo  3  0.61% 
Pechero  189  38.49% 
Widow of a pechero  25  5.09% 
Orphaned son of a pechero  11  2.24% 
Pechero woman  6  1.22% 
Total taxpayer households  301  61.30% 
     
Clergy  21  4.28% 
     
Total  491  100.00% 
           Source: tax roll for 1530 contained in PP 137.6. 
Even at the early date of 1530, this northern community of approximately 2,500 inhabitants 
already had 34.42% of hidalgo households, with 13.65% more claiming to be such while still 
                                                 
26 As discussed later in the paper, my attention was drawn to Briones because of the elevated number of 
“distributive” lawsuits emanating from this town. That this peculiar tax roll was compiled might well be a result of 
such litigation. However, in the over 500 individual lawsuits I have manually examined, I have not come across 
another tax roll that provides a similar breakdown of the population by social standing. 15 
paying taxes. Of the 169 hidalgo households, only one had won its status in the courts, while 
three had attained it by royal privilege, either bought or conferred. Hidalgos were twice as likely 
as pecheros to leave behind widows and orphans; this might possibly reflect the disincentive that 
kept hidalgo widows from marrying anyone but another hidalgo, since they would have 
otherwise lost their noble status. Finally, 28 taxpayer households were exempted from taxes by 
reason of extreme poverty; their breakdown was 20 pecheros, 2 dubious hidalgos, 3 widows of 
pecheros and 3 pechero women. These figures imply a 9.3% poverty rate among taxpayer 
households. Since the tax was assessed on a capitation basis, it is not possible to use these data to 
draw further inference about the wealth distribution of the town. 
Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of all the lawsuits filed at the Sala de Hijosdalgo of 
the Royal Chancery Court of Vallodolid between the 1501 and 1650, by quarter century. The 
jurisdiction of the Court, the Kingdom of Castile north of the river Tagus, is clearly delineated by 
the data points.
27  The main centres of legal activity were the upper Ebro valley, known as the 
Montaña, (to the northeast of the map) and the western portion of Old Castile, in the provinces of 
León and Zamora.  
The first noteworthy pattern emerging from the maps is the temporal distribution of legal 
activity, which parallels the arc of population growth and economic performance in Early 
Modern Castile. Castilian population grew rapidly in the second and third quarters of the 
sixteenth century, prompting a shift to more intensive land use, higher urbanization, and possibly 
higher productivity. This trend started to reverse around 1575, with a marked population decline 
and a corresponding movement to less intensive farming starting in earnest after 1600. Figure 1 
                                                 
27 Occasionally a lawsuit would be filed from outside these boundaries because the claimant had previously lived in 
the jurisdiction of the Court and the evidence would be gathered in Old Castile. The boundaries in the maps are the 
modern Spanish regions (comunidades autónomas). 16 
and Figure 2 show that litigation followed a remarkably similar trend. Lawsuits peaked in the 
third quarter of the sixteenth century, fell slightly in the fourth, and experienced a marked 
decline after 1600. Such a pattern suggests that any process linking ennoblement to economic 
performance should focus on a contemporary causal link, and that such a link could well run 
from economic performance to ennoblement, rather than in the opposite direction often assumed 
in the literature. 
A second point worthy of attention is that, at the beginning and at the end of the period, litigation 
was roughly uniformly distributed throughout the entire geographical area, with few population 
centres showing more than a handful of lawsuits; in the years between 1525 and 1600, however, 
there were several towns with large numbers of filings (shown as larger circles). This 
concentration of legal activity is the key to the arguments presented in the remainder of the 
article. 17 
Figure 2: Geographical distribution of lawsuits filed at the Sala de Hijosdalgo 
 
Source: España. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid. Pleitos de Hijosdalgo. 18 
 
The nobility lawsuits described in this section all reflect individual bids for hidalguía, and 
constitute only the first piece of the rent-seeking puzzle in Early Modern Castile. The next 
section studies a different kind of legal proceeding which hidalgos and pecheros used to jostle 
for the control of towns and the distribution of the fiscal burden.  
3. Distributive conflict 
During the Middle Ages, towns and cities enjoyed an extraordinary degree of autonomy that, 
together with specific prerogatives and tailor-made legal codes (fueros), had been granted by the 
Crown as way of securing widespread support in the war against the Arab kingdoms. Town 
councils were usually dominated by a commoner elite, which freely ignored the privileges of 
hidalgos, blocking them from access to public office, taxing them, and even banning them from 
living in their jurisdiction altogether. While such actions violated the nobles’ privileges, their 
concerns were normally shrugged off by the pechero-dominated councils, and any royal rulings 
favourable to hidalgos were dutifully acknowledged and promptly ignored.
28 After the 
unification of Spain in 1492, with the Arab threat gone and the larger demands of Early Modern 
European policy and warfare pressing on its coffers, the monarchy moved to impose a stronger 
grip on towns, projecting its power through tribunals, marshals and, as in the case of the revolt of 
the Comunidades, full armies if needed.
29 Hidalgos soon took advantage of the newly found 
                                                 
28 The Spanish legal jargon even contains the expression “obedezco pero no cumplo” – I obey but I do not comply – 
to describe the flagrant flouting of orders from a higher authority. It is most often associated with the administration 
of Spanish America, where the monarchy could do little to prevent distant viceroys and lower officials from acting 
as they pleased. For a treatment of the weak position of hidalgos within the pechero-dominated councils in the late 
Middle Ages, see Díaz de la Guardia (2005), chapter 3. 
29 See Lynch (1991) for an account of the consolidation of absolutist power in early sixteenth century Spain. 19 
strength of royal courts to reclaim their long ignored privileges, demanding access to the 
government of their towns and trying to shift the tax burden towards commoners.
30 
Two perennial issues of contention between hidalgos and pecheros were the allocation of local 
government posts and the use of town revenues. An old unwritten custom, often toyed with by 
the Cortes and respected by the courts but never written into hard law, established that hidalgos 
and pecheros should split evenly the available positions in local government; since pecheros 
were normally much more numerous, the system, known as mitad de los oficios (literally “half 
the offices”), gave enormous influence to hidalgos, although it was rarely enforced before the 
sixteenth century.
31 
Castilian cities were also richly endowed with a particular kind of communal goods called 
propios; unlike actual commons, a local government could enclose or otherwise grant the 
exclusive use of propios to a private party in exchange for a monetary payment. Just as they had 
bestowed a large degree of autonomy on Castilian towns during the Reconquista, Medieval 
monarchs had also generously granted them propios as way of attracting settlers to the newly 
recovered lands.
32 Pecheros in the city government usually tried to use the revenue generated by 
propios to pay the royal taxes allocated to the city and to defray the cost of lawsuits of hidalguía. 
                                                 
30 The ennoblement and distributive litigation by which hidalgos gained control of the administration of municipal 
affairs must not be confused with the sale of jurisdictions, a legal figure by which the king relinquished the eminent 
domain over townships in exchange for a lump-sum payment. The jurisdictions were often acquired by members of 
the upper nobility, who were invested as overlords of the town and became entitled to collect the royal taxes 
generated by it. Overlords, however, were often barred from interfering in the day-to-day affairs of the towns they 
acquired, leaving hidalgos and commoners free to jostle over municipal positions. Several lawsuits from Peñafiel, 
for example, state that people in the payroll of the Duke of Osuna, overlord of the town, were barred from holding 
municipal office (PAF 538.5, 538.6, 502.3, 329.1). The town of Villalpando also witnessed intense distributive 
litigation despite being subject to the overlordship of the Enriquez family (SHP 633.22). Brumont (1993) makes the 
case that the two processes – sale of jurisdictions and fight over municipal offices – did not influence each other. 
Yun (1987, p. 77-81) argues that overlords treated their domains with the same hands-off approach to municipal 
matters employed by the king in the royal demesne. For further detail on the sale of jurisdictions see Nader (1990).  
31 On the system of mitad de los oficios see Díaz de la Guardia (2005) and Domínguez Ortiz (1985), p. 129. 
32 On propios see Artola (1993), vol. 5, pp. 981-83. 20 
These moves were vigorously contested by hidalgos, legitimate ones and self-avowed alike. 
Established hidalgos did not want their share of communal revenue to pay for a tax they were 
exempt from; claimants of hidalguía naturally did not want the communal revenue (in which 
they too had a stake) to fund lawsuits against their pretentions to nobility. 
The key document for the analysis of this distributive conflict is a particular kind of lawsuit in 
which hidalgos and pecheros took part as collective units (estados). For lack of a better word, I 
use the term “distributive” to refer to these lawsuits (as opposed to the individual “nobility” 
lawsuits described in the previous section). Figure 3 shows their temporal distribution.
33 
                                                 
33 The way to identify distributive lawsuits in the database of the Archive of the Royal Chancery Court is to exclude 
those lawsuits to which an individual was a part, as individuals could only sue in the Sala de Hijosdalgo if their 
nobility was in question, and not because of distributive matters. Because of the peculiarities of the search engine, 
which does not allow searches by exclusion, I identified distributive lawsuits as those in which one of the parties is 
formed by hidalgos as a collective, and the other by pecheros. I also allowed either hidalgos or pecheros to be 
replaced by village authorities, such as alcaldes, regidores or justicia. The search strings used on the database of the 
archive were: the hidalgos, the state of the hijosdalgo, those who call themselves hidalgos, hidalgo neighbors, the 
officers of the hijosdalgo, the pecheros, the state of the pecheros, pechero neighbours, the mayor, the council, the  
justice. While in principle this methodology does not guarantee that the identified lawsuits would have dealt with 
distributive issues, a 10% hand check resulted in finding only distributive lawsuits. 21 
Figure 3: Estimate of distributive lawsuits and 5-period moving average
 34 
 
Source: catalogue of the Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid. 
Distributive lawsuits follow a similar progression to that of lawsuits proper during the life of the 
Chancery Court, peaking in the late sixteenth century and then declining to about half their peak 
level.
 Most towns in my sample were only involved in distributive litigation once or twice, with a 
record 9 cases registered by Briones between 1529 and 1570. The remainder of this section uses 
six examples to illustrate the workings of distributive lawsuits and their impact on the finances of 
towns. The examples are purposefully drawn from areas with distinct geographical, economic 
                                                 
34 These lawsuits were heard by both the Sala de Hijosdalgo and the four civil chambers of the Royal Chancery 
Courts. The civil chambers were served by twelve secretaries (escribanos), but only the lawsuits held by two of 
them were fully catalogued by the archive at the time of writing (Fernando Alonso and Pérez Alonso). However, 
since cases were assigned on a strictly random basis to the different secretaries, the catalogued ones can be safely 
taken to be a one-sixth random sample of the population. To estimate the total number, I multiplied the catalogued 
cases from the civil chambers by six, and added the cases from the Sala de Hijosdalgo (which is fully catalogued). 
For a description of the random assignment mechanism to the secretaries, see Aulestia (1667), pp. 36-41. 22 
and administrative features. They suggests that distributive litigation, often followed by large 
levels of ennoblement, was a phenomenon that pervaded small and medium-sized Castilian 
towns regardless of their geographical location, eminent domain status, and predominant 
economic activity. 
The hidalgos of Medina de Pomar, a medium-sized town in the jurisdiction of Burgos, won a 
ruling in 1553 preventing the council from paying royal taxes out of propios revenue, and 
granting them half of the town’s offices.
35 The commoners fought back, arguing that the city had 
never made a distinction between hidalgos and pecheros (which should be taken to mean that 
pecheros never respected the privileges of the few existing hidalgos). They also denounced the 
numerous commoners who were taking advantage of the situation to call themselves hidalgos, 
thus producing a sharp increase in nobility lawsuits filed against the town. The court nonetheless 
sided with the nobles, confirming their right to half of the town’s positions and ruling that legal 
expenses had to be paid out of direct taxes assessed on commoners. 
Distributive litigation was often followed by a flurry of ennoblement lawsuits. Commoners who 
had formerly been excluded from the town government tried to join the hidalgo camp to gain 
political voice, and incumbents in town government tried to retain control by seeking 
ennoblement themselves. The commoners of Medina de Pomar, for example, bitterly complained 
that soon after the first distributive lawsuit was filed 
“[…] those who were then holding public office pretended to be hidalgos and 
tried to hold on to their offices, saying that they held them as hidalgos, appointing 
to office others who pretend the same, and excluding those who do not hide the 
fact that they have paid taxes in the past.”
36 
                                                 
35 SHP 828.2. 
36 SHP 828.2. 23 
The combination of nobility and distributive litigation was a heavy burden on the town’s 
finances, and by the end of the 1550s Medina de Pomar found itself effectively unable to 
continue defending the massive amount of lawsuits it faced; its common resources were 
depleted, and its social and political structure was radically altered as well.
37 
In Briones the distributive conflict dragged on longer and, in a significant difference, the town 
was allowed to cover legal expenses out of propios revenue at least until 1571, despite vigorous 
opposition from the hidalgos.
38 The protracted battle was taking its toll, though, and by 1570 the 
town already owed over 50,000 maravedíes in legal expenses and had resorted to authorizing the 
logging of an entire woodland, a precious resource in barren Castile, to raise an additional 
15,000. Attorneys for the town also reported that many lawsuits had to be dropped for lack of 
funds.
39 From a 1572 filing, we learn that the town had incurred large debts with private residents 
to keep the wheels of the Chancery Court spinning.
40 The document also reports that, in the rush 
to raise money, many propios had been leased for less than half the amount they would have 
normally fetched (although malfeasance on the part of town officials was also suggested). 
The pecheros of Briones made one last stand in 1589, trying to keep hidalgos out of positions of 
power by interpreting in a peculiar way the requirement that the nobles hold at least half of the 
town’s offices. Town officials manoeuvred to place hidalgos in those offices that would be 
regarded as incompatible with nobility, such as innkeeper and tax collector. Such a move had no 
chance of success, and after a swift intervention by the Chancery Court , the hidalgos firmly 
                                                 
37 See section 5 for a detailed discussion of the economics of nobility litigation in Medina de Pomar. 
38 Several lawsuits result in or refer to royal provisions authorizing the town council to use propios to cover legal 
expenses. See SHP 675.9 (1529), SHP 1546.6 (1554), SHP 70.17 (1563), SHP 162.3 (1571). 
39 SHP 641.3. 
40 SHP 50.11. This lawsuit also gives a detailed account of the town’s budget. Its total annual income was slightly 
over 50,000 maravedíes, all of which were committed to the payment of salaries and repairs. Except for an attorney 
on its regular payroll, all legal expenses had to be funded out of extraordinary income.  24 
established their right to hold at least half of the honourable positions in the town, and with them 
a sufficient amount of power to control its resources. After that date, no further distributive 
lawsuits were filed by residents of Briones.
41 
Very similar situations are evident from the lawsuits originating from the group of towns know 
as the Hermandad de Montes de Oca, near Burgos. Like Medina de Pomar, the hermandad 
(brotherhood) experienced a flurry of litigation after the first distributive lawsuits resulted in the 
introduction of direct taxes and shared power around 1535, with over 60 commoners claiming 
hidalguía between 1540 and 1550; and like Briones, it eventually run out of money to defend its 
lawsuits, but not before selling or leasing its communal assets and incurring large debts.
42  
The three we have examined are clustered in a relatively compact geographic region in the upper 
Ebro valley, an area characterized by intensive farming and comprised mostly in the royal 
demesne (realengo). The same pattern, however, holds true for towns with very different 
characteristics. One example is Peñafiel, located in the Duero valley east of Valladolid. The town 
is in an area of fertile plains that lend themselves to more extensive agriculture and cattle 
breeding. It was subject to the overlordship of the Duke of Osuna, who collected the royal taxes 
generated by the town but was barred from interfering in its internal affairs. The record does not 
show when the hidalgos of Peñafiel secured their right to hold half the town’s offices, but we 
                                                 
41 SHP 1632.1. Since in many places appointments to public office could not be refused under penalty of prison, 
commoners hoped to place hidalgos in the dilemma of declining to serve, thus breaking the law, or accepting offices 
incompatible with nobility. The mandatory character of public service was often used to punish one’s enemies; in 
1654, for example, Luis de Vega was appointed by the mayor of the town of Valderas, in the jurisdiction of León, as 
a collector of the excise on wine. Being illiterate, de Vega could not hope to discharge his duty in any meaningful 
way, but he was nonetheless imprisoned for refusing it. He then appealed to the Royal Chancery Court, claiming 
that, being an hidalgo, he was nonetheless exempt from acting as a tax collector. See SHP 1982.9. 
42 The distributive conflict in the Hermandad de Montes de Oca is documented in SHP 685.6, SHP 100.13, SHP 
656.15, PP 200.1 and PP 200.2. In SHP 656.15 the King’s prosecutor denounced the fact that most claimants of 
hidalguía were acting as one another’s witnesses and attorneys and that witnesses brought to Valladolid to testify in 
favor of the claimants were regularly treated to luxurious accommodations and meals right before their court 
hearings. 25 
know it was in place by 1532, the date of the first distributive lawsuit. The litigation in Peñafiel 
revolved around the troubles the hidalgos encountered with filling all the offices allocated to 
them. The commoners had in fact obtained a Chancery Court ruling that mandated term limits of 
one year for most town officials and imposed a waiting period of two or three years before 
officials could be reelected. Furthermore, all persons in the employ of the Duke of Osuna were 
barred from serving in public office, as were those associated with the butcher shops, some of 
whom were hidalgos despite the clearly manual nature of the occupation. As a result, the few 
hidalgos of Peñafiel often found themselves unable to fill the offices allocated to them. In an 
underhanded attempt to retain their half of the town’s offices, hidalgos resorted to nominating 
minors, prisoners or even exiles. The commoners fought these manoeuvres time and again, 
managing to retain their control of the town’s finances. Their success discouraged people from 
becoming hidalgos, and hence there were few ennoblement lawsuits in Peñafiel. 
43 
A second revealing case from the Castilian plains is that of Villalpando, a thriving mercantile 
centre in the Tierra de Campos (an area comprised of parts of the modern provinces of Zamora, 
Valladolid, Palencia and León) subject to the overlordship of the Enríquez family. The town had 
experienced a large wave of ennoblement in the 1530s, with fully 23 lawsuits filed in 1535 alone. 
No distributive lawsuits survive from that period in the catalogued portion of the archive; a 
distributive lawsuit from 1568, however, provides an invaluable window onto the size of the 
resources at stake in distributive litigation.
44  The lawsuit was initiated by the commoners, who 
asked the town’s treasurer (an office under hidalgo control) to supply 37,500 maravedíes to pay 
for legal expenses relative to nobility litigation. When the treasurer refused, the court ordered 
                                                 
43 The distributive lawsuits from Peñafiel that support this account are SHP 783.36 and PAF 329.1, 502.3, 503.1, 
538.5, 538.6. 
44 SHP 633.22. 26 
him to provide a detailed account of the annual revenues the town derived from propios. The 
total amounted to a staggering 443,013 maravedíes per year, mostly from land and woodland 
rents. The control of such resources was a prize well worth fighting over.
45 
In a final example, the council of Ibias, a region dotted with small villages in mountainous 
Asturias, did not witness any nobility lawsuits until 1571. From then to 1595, 69 families – 
virtually the entire commoner population of the council – claimed hidalguía. A distributive 
lawsuit from 1572 tells a story that is in many ways the mirror image of that of Peñafiel. Asturias 
was one of the most ancient provinces of Castile, and it had a high proportion of nobles – in 
Ibias, hidalgos made up around 90% of the population in 1571.
46 Hidalgos used their position of 
dominance to saddle commoners with most of the fiscal burden of the town, reducing sales taxes, 
which hidalgos paid, to a minimum while increasing direct taxes.
47 Commoners reacted by 
claiming nobility, and the record shows they largely succeeded. In Ibias tax redistribution was 
the proximate cause of ennoblement. Yet the events do not fit the story of an exogenous increase 
in royal taxation that sustains the treason of the bourgeoisie argument, and they are still 
consistent with a local rent-seeking view of ennoblement. 
The six communities studied above represent many of the varied physical, productive and 
political environments of Old Castile. They were not isolated cases; the archival record shows 
that several other towns found themselves in similar situations. Díaz de la Guardia (2005) 
documents a similar pattern for Southern Spain as well. 
                                                 
45 This amount excludes taxes and revenues from the fairs, which accrued directly to the overlords of the town and 
were not under the control of the town council (Yun 1987, p. 77, 82-86). The amount of those resources was also 
sizable, and many towns sought to retain control over them by purchasing their own charter of cityhood when the 
king decided to sell their jurisdiction (Nader, 1990). 
46 See SHP 21.5. 
47 SHP 447.20 describes how the hidalgo-dominated town council redefined the fiscal obligations of the town to the 
Crown, shifting their burden to direct taxes. 27 
4. The subjects, motives and timing of ennoblement. 
Who sought ennoblement, why did they seek it, and what motivated their timing? We can answer 
these questions by examining the abundant nobility litigation in Medina de Pomar. The choice of 
this town was entirely dictated by its excellent archival record. In order to identify the socio-
economic extraction of litigants and their success rates, I need to match them to at least two 
different tax rolls several years apart. Portions of tax rolls were sometimes filed by towns to 
show that a claimant of hidalguía had paid taxes in the past, but complete tax rolls are rare, and 
only for Medina de Pomar was I able to find two of them within a meaningful period. In all other 
respects, however, Medina de Pomar is an average Castilian town, and its pattern of litigation is 
found repeatedly throughout Castile. The distribution of nobility lawsuits involving its residents 
is shown in Figure 4. 28 
Figure 4: Lawsuits of hidalguía in Medina de Pomar, 1490-1630 
 
Source: catalogue of the Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid. 
The legal activity emanating from Medina  de Pomar would clearly not be worthy of mention if 
it were not for the 1550s. A closer look at the 63 lawsuits filed between 1550 and 1559 further 
reveals that fully 41 of them were filed in 1554 alone. The key to the flurry of litigation is found 
in a 1553 distributive lawsuit in which hidalgos won half the offices of the town: 
In this town there has never been a difference between hidalgos and pecheros 
because all the pechos (direct royal taxes paid by the town to the Crown) were 
always paid from communal revenues until one and a half years ago, when it was 
ordered that they should not be paid from communal revenues.
48 
In another document related to the same dispute, several witnesses were asked how many 
households were there in the town, and how many of them were headed by hidalgos. All but one 
                                                 
48 SHP 828.2. In a similar case, we learn that the small town of Villalobos, in the jurisdiction of Montes de Oca, was 
also free of direct taxes until 1540. See SHP 679.1. 29 
of them reported that the town counted about 300 households (roughly 1500 inhabitants), of 
which no more than 3 or 4 were from hidalgo lineages; the last witness put the numbers at 350 
households and 6 or 7 hidalgo ones.
49 Immediately after the distributive lawsuit allocated half the 
offices to nobles and reinstituted direct taxation about 20% of the population of Medina de 
Pomar claimed hidalguía, and the town found itself in the uncomfortable position of having to 
defend over sixty lawsuits with limited resources. This type of behavior, repeated throughout 
many Castilian towns between 1525 and 1600, produced the concentration of lawsuits evidenced 
in Figure 2. After the fact, the optimal decision might well have been not to fight back; at the 
time, however, those in power decided to do otherwise. 
Matching litigants to tax rolls. 
The opening salvo in the battle of Medina de Pomar was a request filed in 1554, asking the 
Royal Chancery Court to authorize a special contribution of 15,000 maravedíes to pay for the 
several lawsuits it had to fight. Despite the vigorous opposition of those claiming to be hidalgos, 
the Chancery Court granted the request, with the added provision that all those who were not in 
firm possession of an hidalguía should be included in the assessment.
50  Since no lawsuit filed in 
1554 had yet been decided, and since individual contributions were determined in rough 
proportion to individual wealth, the tax roll that was drawn as a result is an excellent tool to 
determine the socio-economic extraction of those who filed for hidalguía.
51  
                                                 
49 SHP 707.2. Most of the witnesses were former town officials, including a former mayor, which lends some 
credibility to their estimates. These figures are consistent with the 1590 census (González, 1820). 
50 SHP 653.107. 
51 The 1554 tax roll is found in PP 68.5. While the general rule was that richer people should receive a higher 
assessment, the tax assessor, who was appointed by the town council, had a large degree of discretion in determining 
individual tax bills. Since the situation was being closely monitored and there were no cries of outrage over unfair 
assessments, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the rule was largely observed.  30 
I started by looking for the name of everyone who filed a lawsuit between 1550 and 1559 in the 
1554 tax roll. Unlike the list from Briones, this one was compiled with the utmost care to 
identify each taxpayer with fully spelled first and last names. Common names were 
supplemented with the neighbourhood in which the person lived, and sometimes with their 
profession as well. As a result, I have been able to uniquely match 50 of the 63 claimants to the 
tax roll, almost an 80% success rate; the missed matches are spread in almost exact proportion to 
the cases filed each year and hence do not pose any bias concerns. 
I then used a 1562 tax roll corresponding to the regular royal tax (the first extant one after 1554) 
to determine whether the people in my matched sample were still paying taxes eight years later. I 
defined a litigant as “unsuccessful” if, despite having filed a lawsuit, he or she was still being 
assessed direct taxes by 1562. Conversely, if the litigant was no longer in the tax roll, I called 
him or her “successful.” Unlike the 1530 document from Briones, the tax rolls of Medina de 
Pomar did not list neighbours without any tax liability, and so the meaning of “success” needs to 
be qualified: while winning an ejecutoria would certainly make someone a successful litigant by 
this measure, so would dying, becoming poor, relocating to a different town, or simply being 
missed in the matching exercise. Unsuccessful litigants, on the other hand, are a sharp lower 
bound on the ability of the town to keep claimants of hidalguía within its tax rolls. 
For the purposes of the 1554 extraordinary tax, the population of the town was divided into 8 
brackets; at the lower end, people were taxed in increments of half a real (1 real = 34 
maravedíes). After the 2 reales bracket, tax liability was assessed in increments of one real, with 
a maximum of six reales. A total of 257 households were assessed; the remaining ones would 
have been hidalgo, poor, or might have been exempted for other reasons. If the poverty rate had 
been similar to the 9.3% observed in Briones, these numbers would be strongly consistent with 31 
the witness accounts that put the population of the town at about 300 households, of which 
between 3 and 7 would have been hidalgo. Overall, slightly over 16,000 maravedíes of tax 
liability were assessed; while this exceeded the 15,000 authorized by the court, the extra amount 
was probably meant to compensate for potential non-payers. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the tax liability that emerges from the 1554 tax roll, further 
broken down by the litigant status of the household. The implied distribution of wealth has a 
very plausible shape; the 1562 tax roll suggests an even more skewed distribution, since some of 
the households that were assessed at the maximum of six reales in 1554 were even further to the 
right when the total tax bill allowed for it.
52 
                                                 
52 Since the court had allowed the town to assess anyone without an ejecutoria for the purposes of the 1554 
extraordinary contribution, town officials might have wanted to tax as many households as possible as a way to 
strengthen the case for denying them hidalgo status. As a consequence, the tax bill of the richer households might 
have been kept artificially low to ensure that every taxable household in the lower wealth brackets was assessed at 
least some tax, while not exceeding the maximum revenue allowed by the court. 32 
Figure 5: Distribution of tax liability by litigants – Medina de Pomar, 1554. 
 
Source: Catalogue of the Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid and the tax rolls for the years 
1554 (PP 68.5) and 1562 (PP 68.6). 
The above data allow to examine the town’s strategy for fighting the avalanche of lawsuits. 
Figure 6 divides the population into 2-reales tax brackets, and reports the percentage of each tax 
bracket that filed a lawsuit of hidalguía between 1550 and 1559, further broken down by whether 
they were successful or not as defined above. 33 
Figure 6: Litigants as percentage of tax bracket 
 
Source: See text. 
It is clear that richer households were much more likely to claim being hidalgo; 70% of 
households in the highest tax bracket filed a lawsuit, while only 14.95% of those in the lower 
bracket did. It is also apparent that those in power directed the town’s legal efforts to keep the 
wealthy households out of the ranks of hidalgos. Two thirds of the households in the upper 
bracket of the 1554 assessment who claimed hidalguía were still paying taxes in 1562; in 
comparison, only one quarter of the lower income households who filed lawsuits during the 1550 
decade were still in the 1562 tax roll. Securing noble status was not a guaranteed outcome, 
especially for the rich. 
A cursory glance at the data might suggest that the traditional interpretation of ennoblement was 
not too implausible; changes in the fiscal burden were, after all, contemporaneous with claims of 34 
nobility.
53 A closer study of the taxation data and the costs of litigation, however, reveals that 
drawing such an inference would be incorrect. The main problem with the traditional argument is 
that the value of direct taxes was not nearly high enough to justify by itself the trouble and 
expense involved in acquiring an hidalguía through the judicial route. As the sixteenth century 
progressed the Crown left the direct tax burden virtually untouched while concentrating its fiscal 
efforts in the increase of indirect taxes and the imposition of levies collected through the church, 
both paid by commoners and hidalgos alike.
54 In Briones, for example, the wealthiest 
commoners paid less than 300 maravedíes per year in royal direct taxes in 1568.
55 In Medina de 
Pomar, with the exception of one person who paid 1,200 maravedíes, no one was assessed over 
375 maravedíes in 1580.
56 Such sums were equivalent to about a week of an urban labourer’s 
wages, a sum that, as the following analysis shows, could not justify the cost of a lawsuit of 
hidalguía even under the most favourable assumptions.
57 
The returns to ennoblement. 
Obtaining a precise estimate of the total cost of a lawsuit is an arduous task, as no clear 
information survives in this respect. A 1570 estimate by a royal auditor put the cost of the 
average lawsuit at 24,000 maravedíes, while Kagan (1981), using evidence from civil cases, 
reached a very similar value.
 58 The evidence from nobility lawsuits is consistent with these 
                                                 
53 In many towns no new taxes were levied, but old taxes were redefined to fall on commoners rather than on nobles. 
This is the case of Medina de Pomar and Ibias in my sample. 
54 The standard source on Castilian fiscality in the second half of the sixteenth century is Ulloa (1977).  
55 PP 37.13. 
56 PP 68.6. The person who received a 1,200 maravedíes assessment was Juan del Campo, who had sued the town 
for an hidalguía in 1554, but lost. His lawsuit is SHP 424.4. 
57 Labourer wages for the relevant years in Old Castile are available in Hamilton (1934). In 1568 they were 68 mrs. 
per day, while in 1580 they were 60 mrs. per day. 
58 Kagan (1981), p. 39. 35 
figures. In one of the cases from Medina de Pomar, the council was sentenced to reimburse the 
costs of Francisco Barbero, whose claim had been successful, in the amount of 9,000 
maravedíes.
59 That figure did not include the fee for the issuance of the carta ejecutoria, which 
was often the single most expensive item of the entire lawsuit, and the final payment to the 
court’s reporter – at least an additional 3,000 maravedíes by Kagan’s count. That the city was 
sentenced to reimburse Barbero was most unusual; in all other cases from Medina de Pomar, 
litigants had to cover their own costs.
60 The Barbero case was also short and expeditiously 
settled, which would have placed it on the cheap end of the spectrum. Data from other locations 
suggest that costs were even higher. The lawsuit of Francisco Daza from Peñafiel cost 24,660 
maravedíes in 1580, excluding the costs of the carta ejecutoria.
61 A single deposition in the 
lawsuit of Mariano García, from Villalpando, in 1535 cost 50,124 maravedíes.
62 And litigation 
records from Ibias mention a lawsuit that would have cost 300 ducats – 112,500 maravedíes.
63 
So what was the rate of return on ennoblement if only the resulting tax exemption is considered? 
Let’s take the wealthiest taxpayers from Medina de Pomar, who paid 375 mrs. per year in direct 
taxes. Assume that there was no risk of losing the lawsuit (although two thirds of the wealthy 
residents of Medina de Pomar who filed actually lost), and that there was also no risk of the city 
challenging the hidalguía further down the road (which was not an unusual occurrence). Assume 
                                                 
59 These costs are reported in a loose paper, SHP 1923.1, containing a 1556 legal filing against the mayor of the 
town, who was refusing to levy a special contribution to pay the judgment. The lawsuit in question is SHP 743.7. 
Since Mr. Barbero had won it before 1554, he was not included in that year’s special levy, and so we don’t know in 
what particular tax bracket he would have fallen.  
60 The norm was for parties to lawsuits to cover their own costs. One party to a suit could be sentenced to reimburse 
its opponent if the judges found it had litigated in bad faith. All cases from Medina de Pomar were individually 
checked to determine cost assessments. 
61 SHP 100.16. 
62 SHP 20.3. 
63 SHP 27.14. 36 
as well that the claimant was completely altruistic about his offspring and considered the 
hidalguía a perpetual stream of tax relief, and that he expected direct taxes to remain constant in 
real terms (when in fact their value was steadily being eroded by inflation). Finally, assume an 
impossibly cheap lawsuit, costing in all 5,000 mrs. (when all indications are that the cheapest 
lawsuits would have easily more than doubled that figure), and abstract from the foregone 
interest on the legal costs during the proceedings (which could drag on for several years). Such a 
setup is equivalent to a risk free perpetuity paying 375 mrs. per year in return for an initial 
investment of 5,000 mrs.; this would imply an annual rate of return of 7.5%, barely higher than 
what most relatively safe bonds paid at the time, and below what could be obtained in the 
mortgage market.
64  With less extreme assumptions, it becomes impossible to justify the cost of a 
ennoblement relying on tax exemptions alone – even in those cases in which more than one 
claimant was included in the same lawsuit. In a more realistic (but still quite optimistic) case 
assuming a cost of 12,000 mrs., a 50% chance of losing the lawsuit and no other risks or delays, 
the rate of return would drop to a negligible 1.5% per year. For the vast majority of people whose 
tax assessments were not as high, the fiscal rates of return to ennoblement would have been even 
lower. In short, the tax exemptions could not have been a motive behind the lawsuits. 
Litigation and city size. 
As discussed in the previous sections, distributive litigation points to political access and the 
redistribution of rents as the main source of the value of ennoblement. To further buttress this 
argument, it is worth noting that the vast majority the nobility lawsuits heard by the Sala de 
                                                 
64 A wealthy sixteenth century Castilian would have been able to use a variety of lending devices to earn interest on 
capital. The most popular private alternative was a form of mortgage – the censo – while, for larger sums, 
purchasing long term bonds from the Crown – the famed juros – was also an option. Juros provided a relatively safe 
return of catorce mil al millar – 7.14%. Yun (1987, p. 257-8) puts the yield of “perfectly safe and solvent” censos in 
Tierra de Campos at 9.9% per year, at least until the 1590s.   37 
Hijosdalgo originated in small and medium-sized communities not unlike Briones or Medina de 
Pomar. The large cities of Northern Castile, among which were the economic and administrative 
powerhouses of Madrid, Valladolid, and Burgos, exhibit a negligible number of cases when 
compared to small provincial towns, and none of them show a pattern of concentrated lawsuits 
like the one exhibited by Medina de Pomar. 
We can explore the relationship between population size and litigation per capita taking 
advantage of the population census of 1590, known as the “Censo de Tomás González” 
(González 1820). To use this source, I first looked up the population of each city, town and 
village in my database in the census. The census coverage is not uniform, and neither is the 
quality of its data. The coverage is sparser for smaller towns, and for the extremely litigious 
Montaña; both shortfalls, however, work against finding a negative relationship between 
litigation rates and population size. The reporting units in the census are either provinces or 
bishoprics; the bishopric data has a large proportion of round numbers, raising questions about 
its quality. I conducted the estimations both with and without them and verified that the results 
were not significantly affected. Finally, since Castile experienced large demographic changes in 
the early years of the seventeenth century due to plagues and internal migrations, I restrict the 
analysis to litigation that took place during the sixteenth century. 
One point of concern is that the limitations of both the census and my own data do not allow for 
any kind of comprehensive sampling of towns without litigation. This creates a bias, as a 
possibly large number of small villages would not have experienced litigation, and hence my 
estimates of average litigation per capita in small cities would overstate the true value. The bias 
disappears as the population grows, as larger towns were more likely to experience at least one 
lawsuit in the course of 100 years. To minimize its impact, I focus on towns and cities with a 38 
1590 population greater than or equal to 100 households (roughly 500 people); it would have 
been unlikely for towns of that size not to have experienced any nobility litigation at all in the 
entire sixteenth century. As a further safeguard, the count-based discussion that follows Figure 7 
is immune to this bias. 
Figure 7: Lawsuits per capita and population (cities with more than 100 households, 1500-1600) 
 
Source: España. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid. Pleitos de Hijosdalgo.  
           González (1820) 
Figure 7 shows a scatter plot of lawsuits per capita against population for cities reported to have 
100 households and over in the 1590 census. The plot shows a clearly negative relationship 
between population and litigation rates. Only one out of 48 cities (2.08%) with more than 1,000 
households had a litigation rate above 5% (Alfaro, in modern-day La Rioja, with 1207 
households). By contrast, 92 out of 645 towns (14.3%) with between 100 and 1,000 households 39 
exceeded the 5% litigation rate. Figure 8 shows a non-parametric regression of lawsuits per 
capita on log population using the above data (the horizontal scale in both figures has been 
converted to show actual population numbers for ease of interpretation).
65 Once again, the 
relationship is clearly negative. 
Figure 8: Kernel regression of lawsuits per capita on log population 
 
Source: See text. 
If tax exemptions had motivated the flight to nobility there would have been no reason for such a 
clear pattern in the geographical distribution of lawsuits. The distributive motive, on the other 
hand, is much more consistent with the data. The reason is that the government of large cities 
was already in the hands of nobles and grandees; hence they would have generated no incentives 
for distributive and nobility litigation. But as the case of Villalpando (743 households, 72 
                                                 
65 The nonparametric regression was conducted using an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth equal to 0.5. The 
thinner lines show 95% confidence intervals obtained by using a bootstrapping technique with 1,000 iterations. 40 
lawsuits) and its yearly income of over 440,000 maravedíes shows, medium-sized towns had 
attractive enough resources to justify their capture via ennoblement. 
The decline of litigation 
Several factors combined to reduce the number of nobility lawsuits by the end of the sixteenth 
century. The marked increase in the number of hidalgos had become a concern for the Crown, 
which in 1593 intervened by adding a number of costly and time consuming hurdles to hidalguía 
litigation, thereby reducing the expected payoff for litigants.
66 Direct taxes had also remained 
frozen in nominal terms since 1539 in the face of widespread inflation, while the bulk of the 
fiscal burden had gradually shifted to sales and excise taxes, which hidalgos were not exempt 
from. In addition, after the experiences of Medina de Pomar and a number of other towns, local 
governments probably learnt that opposing claims to municipal offices by hidalgos would result 
in ruinous legal battles. They would have therefore chosen to reach an accommodation with the 
hidalgos rather than fighting them in court. With the costs of obtaining an hidalguía on the rise 
and its benefits constantly eroded, ennoblement ceased to be an attractive proposition. Finally, 
the economic slowdown of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century would have likely 
reduced the value of appropriable resources in Castilian municipalities. The fall in litigation, 
however, did not bring about the decline of hidalguía as a mark of social distinction. The title of 
                                                 
66 The most important rules imposed by Philip II in 1593 were a) that all witnesses travel to Valladolid to be 
personally examined by one of the three judges rather than having an itinerant court official depose them in their 
hometowns; b) that when a witness was unable to make the trip, one of the three judges travel to take a deposition; 
c) that all “dubious” ejecutorias issued in the last 20 years be revised and, if justified, revoked. While the extent of 
the enforcement of this last requirement is unclear, the other two (and many minor ones) were certainly a major 
factor in increasing the length and cost of the proceedings. The judges protested the new norms, but the king 
imposed his will. See CP 5.5 and CP 5.7.   41 
hidalgo was hereditary, and its lustre persisted well into the nineteenth century. , relieved, from 
1783 on, of the legal (if unenforced) incompatibility with any kind of profession.
67  
5. Conclusion. 
The institution of hidalguía emerged during the late Middle Ages as a product of the war against 
the Arab kingdoms; distinguished military service was rewarded with an honorific title, the 
advantages of which included tax exemptions, legal privileges and an ongoing commitment to 
serve in times of war. The prohibition of engaging in “vile” or “mechanical” occupations, though 
of unclear origin, was intended to keep hidalgos well trained in the military arts. 
Over time, the concept of hidalguía came under pressure from several directions. The grant of 
universal privileges to certain areas, such as Biscay, made it difficult for everyone to honour the 
technical requirements of the title. By the sixteenth century the entire peninsula was in Christian 
hands, all but ending the intermittent episodes of small-scale warfare to which hidalgos had been 
normally summoned, and the changes in military technology required the creation of armies with 
an increasing degree of time commitment and professionalism.
68 While hidalguías were 
sometimes used to reward special favours or monetary contributions, most notably by Henry IV 
Trastámara (r. 1454-1474), the Catholic Kings (r. 1474-1516) revoked most of the privileges 
granted in such fashion, and the institution seemed headed towards an opaque decline. 
The revival and rapid expansion of hidalguía during the sixteenth century was traditionally 
blamed on supposedly indiscriminate sales of patents by Charles V and Philip II. Although that 
argument has been proved wrong by Thompson (1979), no alternative explanation has surfaced 
                                                 
67 The legal (though unenforced) incompatibility of hidalguía with manual professions was eliminated in 1783. See 
Thompson (1987),  p. 29. 
68 On Spain’s role in pioneering the military revolution of the sixteenth century see Parker (1976). 42 
to replace it. Using legal cases argued before the Valladolid Royal Chancery Court, I have 
further shown that tax exemptions, while a welcome bonus for an hidalgo, in most cases could 
not justify the time, expense, or risk involved in a lawsuit of hidalguía.  
The sixteenth century ushered in a renewed assertion of royal power, spearheaded by the  
Catholic Kings and consolidated under Charles V and Philip II. As a result, towns that had 
previously met royal tax obligations from their communal properties were increasingly forced to 
impose direct taxes on their commoners. Hidalgos were also successful in reclaiming their right 
to half of towns’ offices, backed by the Royal Chancery Courts when needed.  
In the cases where litigation flared, the conflict over local control could easily deplete the 
resources of the towns, which were spent fighting nobility and distributive lawsuits. Distributive 
and ennoblement litigation came at a time when municipal resources were strained. Many towns 
had indeed gone to great financial efforts to purchase their charters of cityhood from the Crown; 
doing so prevented local overlords from capturing their royal tax streams but did lead to heavy 
debts (Nader, 1990). Despite legal strategies aimed to keep the richest (and possibly most 
powerful) neighbours on the tax rolls, towns could not hope to defend the dozens of lawsuits that 
piled up against them over the years. Many of them must have chosen not to fight, as their ruling 
elites reluctantly consented to a redistribution of resources for the sake of avoiding an even 
larger reduction in both their own personal income and in the town’s wealth. 
The archival record is silent on the efficiency implications of the redistribution; there is nothing 
to indicate that hidalgos would have made better or worse administrators of town property or, in 
the case they embezzled or appropriated public resources, that they would have diverted them 
from their most productive use. There is also little support for the “treason of the bourgeoisie” 
hypothesis; while hidalgos took pride in their title and ostensibly complied with all its 43 
requirements, I have been unable to find a single piece of evidence showing hidalgos being 
stripped of their privileges for engaging in banned professions. Quite to the contrary, several 
documents casually mention hidalgos freely engaging in “mechanical and vile” activities 
throughout Spain; of course, in the areas that enjoyed universal hidalguía, such occurrences were 
almost a tautology. 
The number of hidalgos did in fact grow substantially during the sixteenth century. By 1600 at 
least 6,221 ejecutorias had been issued for Northern Castile alone, each representing the start of 
a new hidalgo lineage or the confirmation of one whose purity had been challenged. Since 
ejecutorias do not include self-avowed hidalgos who were not challenged or whose lawsuits 
were dropped by the towns, they represent just a lower bound on the number of families that 
established themselves as part of the petty nobility. The rest of the traditional wisdom regarding 
hidalgos, though, needs to be thoroughly reexamined. Tax incentives seem to have had little to 
do with ennoblement; distributive conflict, often dismissed as inconsequential, played an 
important role; and although the misallocation of talent argument holds some appeal, what 
evidence is available suggests that occupational restrictions were widely ignored. Finally, while 
substantial redistribution certainly took place at the local level, and some localities suffered large 
losses through litigation, these processes seem unlikely candidates in explaining the prolonged 




All primary source references are from the holdings of the Archivo de la Real Chancillería de 
Valladolid. The abbreviations corresponding to the different sections of the archive are: 
 
SHP: Sala de Hijosdalgo – Pleitos 
PAF: Perez Alonso - Fenecidos 
PP: Protocolos y Padrones 
RE: Registro de Ejecutorias 
CP: Cédulas y Pragmáticas 
 
Figures 2, 7 and 8 were compiled on the basis of an extract of digital entries from the catalogue 
of Archive of the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid pursuant to an agreement for the use of 
electronic databases between the University of British Columbia and the Ministry of Culture of 
Spain. It is cited as “España. Ministerio de Cultura. Archivo de la Real Chancillería de 
Valladolid. Pleitos de Hijosdalgo.” All other figures compiled on the basis of the catalogue of the 
Archive of the Royal Chancery Court of Valladolid employ data retrieved through publicly 
accessible interfaces. 
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